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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900022-CA
Priority No. 2

JOHNNY MEDINA DURAN,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann.
section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (jurisdiction over criminal convictions less
than first degree felonies).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE
1. Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Duran's motion to
dismiss the habitual criminal charge?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court's conclusions of law are entitled to no
deference, and are reversible if incorrect.

State v. Johnson, 771

P.2d 326, 327 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 781 P.2d 878 (Utah 1989).

STATUTES
The following statutes will be relied upon and are
contained in the body of the brief:

New Mexico Statutes Ann. section 30-2-3
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-103
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2a-3(3)
Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-205
Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-206
Utah Code Ann. section 78-8-1001

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal from an order denying Mr. Duran's
motion to dismiss the habitual criminal charge, which order preceded
the entry of conditional guilty pleas, judgments and convictions for
two counts of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance,
second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section
58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon,
Judge, presiding.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Duran was originally charged with two counts of
unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, and was also
charged with being an habitual criminal (R. 5-7). Defense counsel
submitted two motions to dismiss the habitual criminal charge,
arguing that dismissal was appropriate because 1) the State could
not demonstrate that the New Mexico conviction underlying the
habitual criminal charge would constitute a second degree felony
under Utah law (R. 24-28); and 2) Mr. Duran did not serve two
separate periods of confinement for the two convictions underlying
the habitual criminal charge (R. 52-56).
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At the first hearing on the motion on July 28, 1989,
defense counsel argued only the first theory, indicating that if the
court were unwilling to dismiss the case, the court should
trifurcate the proceedings, with a phase to determine guilt on the
distribution charges, a phase to determine the legal sufficiency of
the New Mexico felony, and then a phase for the jurors to determine
if Mr. Duran were an habitual criminal (T. 3-4).
The prosecutor indicated that the issue before the trial
court was how to evaluate the New Mexico felony under Utah law,
either by comparing the elements of the New Mexico conviction with
the elements of a Utah crime, or by evaluating the facts underlying
the New Mexico conviction and determining which provision of Utah
law defined the crime involved (T. 5-7).
The trial court indicated as follows:
We are not going to retry this case. We are
not going to try his New Mexico case. It is
simply something that isn't going to be done. I
think the only way we can approach this at this
point is to have you and the State obtain a
transcript of the plea. I don't know what they
do there. If they do what we do here in the
State of Utah, there will be a statement or
affidavit when he pled guilty. If there isn't,
there will be a statement of what the elements of
the crime are and what the facts are to which he
is pleading. And that will certainly, if that
exists, that record will indicate what the facts
were in that case to bring him within the
elements of the crime in New Mexico; and it will
be those facts to which he made a plea that will
determine whether or not if that had been pled
here, it would have been a second or third degree
felony.
....

I think we need that to which he made a
plea. If he made a statement, there may be a
defense argument whether it was given freely and

- 3

-

voluntarily or not. I don't know, but we have to
have more than that.
Now, I think now you need a transcript of
his pleading guilty and see what he pled to, and
see if there are facts to which he made a plea
to. And if he did, I will use that to determine
whether or not if that had been pled here or if
h€i had been found guilty of those facts here, if
it would have been a second or third degree
f€>lony.
....

Okay. I deny the Motion to Dismiss Count 3,
the crime of habitual criminal. The statute
76-8-1001 is very clear in its language that a
crime which if committed within the state would
have been a felony, second degree felony and so
forth, would be sufficient to meet the
requirements. And it doesn't matter what
New Mexico calls it. It matters what we will
call it in Utah, and if his actions there, if
committed here would have been a second degree
felony, you have met the burden in that regard.
(T. 9-11).
At the second hearing on the motion to dismiss the habitual
criminal count, held on October 17, 1989, defense counsel focused on
the second theory, arguing that because Mr. Duran#s sentences on the
two convictions relied on by the State were concurrent, there were
not two separate periods of confinement to support the habitual
criminal charge (T.2 2-5). The prosecutor disputed the legal
accuracy of this argument and submitted documents relating to the
Utah conviction and the New Mexico felony (T.2 7).
Defense counsel noted that the trial court had already
rejected the first argument relating to the translation of the
New Mexico felony into a Utah felony (T.2 7-8).1

The remainder of

1. The reasoning of the trial court is somewhat less than
clear. It appears that the trial court intended to analyze the
translation of the New Mexico conviction by looking at the facts
(continued)
- 4
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counsel's argument focused solely on the second theory for
dismissal, relating

i. w'".

i

'New' Mexico felonies (T.2 8-9).
The

court ruled as follows:

There is no question that there have been
two convictions, separate from one another. And
there is no question that there has been two
sentences imposed, separate from one another.
And, I guess it really comes down to whether or
not there is one or two convictions. And this
Court is going to hold and find that there have
been two commitments separate and apart from one
another.
The Court is often faced with a question on
multiple counts in sentencing a prisoner, whether
one has been convicted of ten counts, whether to
take those and make him serve his time in the
State Prison, 1 to 15 years to run consecutive1y
or whether to make those run concurrently. And
if they are not truly separate counts, then the
Court would be in error in sentencing either
consecutively or concurrently. And if they are
not truly separate counts, then the Court would
be in error in sentencing either consecutively or
concurrently. There would have to be a
conviction on the lessor included offense or the
offense itself, whichever the law would provide.

(footnote 1 continued)
shown in the New Mexico plea hearing and/or the elements of the
New Mexico crime (T. 9-11). After the prosecutor indicated that she
would procure the documents necessary to such analysis, but before
the documents were procured or analyzed, the trial court denied the
motion (T. 11). The prosecutor continued to voice intent to present
the documentation, and in fact presented it at the beginning of the
next hearing, indicating that the documents supported denial of the
motion to dismiss (T.2 5-6).
The trial court never returned to analyze the translation
few Mexico conviction.
Because this is a question of law, this Court is empowered
to decide it without regard to the trial court's analysis, Olwell v.
Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 586-587 n. 1 (Utah 1982) t arid should recognize
that it was the prosecution's duty to demonstrate the applicability
of the habitual criminal charge, see State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146,
149 (Utah 1989); State v. Williams. 651 P.2d 569, 580-582 (Ida. App.
1982), Relevant transcript pages are attached in Appendix 1.

In a case where you have totally separate
incidents, if it were drugs, totally separate
sales of totally different times, those are
individual, independent crimes. Each one could
be tried separately, one from the other, and
often are. And sometimes they are tried together
and that sometimes becomes a legal argument that
we are confronted with, but each one is a
separate and different crime.
The most compelling argument you make is the
argument of giving the man two different trips to
prison before you are going to hammer him with
the habitual criminal statute. That is the best
argument. But as I read this statute, I think it
is clear from the documents that Mr. Duran has
besen convicted for two separate crimes, in two
s€»parate states, has been sentenced for two
separate crimes, in two separate states, and has
been committed by two separate Courts, in two
separate states. And the fact that one of those
states was good enough to cut him a break and
say, "We'll let this sentence run concurrent with
the other sentence," should not be to his benefit
because the Court could have just as easily said,
"This would be a consecutive sentence and when
you finish your term down in New Mexico, then you
can come up and start your term up in Utah."
I believe that is what is intended by this
statute to deal with different crimes, different
conditions, different sentences and different
commitments. And the fact that one of the judges
allowed the sentence in his state to run at the
same time the other one is running in another
state, does not negate the applicability of the
habitual criminal statute. The motion therefore
is denied.
(T.2 9-11).
Defense counsel requested a continuance for interlocutory
review of the ruling (T.2 11-12), and the trial court denied the
request (T.2 13).
After further proceedings, Mr. Duran pled guilty to two
counts of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, and the
trial court accepted the pleas (T.2 63-64).
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Defense counsel then

indicated that the; plea agreement with the State recognized that the
plea

was

conditional

in

IN iiiiiii

IIINII

criminal issues (T 2 65-86).

in

,.

i 111111

i

tippi'iii
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IL

The court indicated, "They will never

State iias dismissed it,
that,

1m1

. You have a i

can make a record on
f

:

:i t Is dismissed there is nothing to appeal there is no issue."
(T 2 i id)

HI isecutor made i 10 comment concerning the conditional
plea. 2

nature of

SUMMARY Of THE ARGUMENT
In charging Mr. Duran under the habitual criminal sta t: .\ i I: .e,
the State relied on a third degree felony conviction from another
a second
degree felony in Utah,
statute
|jt"[ l i n l '

required

che habitual criminal

Additionally, because Mr. Duran did not serve separate
I I |

( ' l u l l i i n Mill i l I

IIIIIII

IIIIIII

Ihin

i 11 t e i ' i s n * s

1 i • 1 in il

IIIIIII

I i . Illllllll(,

t a t e

i.n alleging the habitual criminal charge, Mr. Duran's motion for
dismissal of the habitual criminal charge should have been granted.

2. 11 i State v. Bobo. 131 Utah Adv Rep. 25 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) (per curiam), which was filed after the hearings in this case,
this Court indicated that the conditional nature of conditional
pleas must be set forth in the record. Id. at 25. The record
before the Court :i i i 1 " ; case shows that the prosecutor did not
dispute the plea bargain understanding that the pleas were entered
on the condition that Mr. Duran could appeal the denial of motions
to dismiss the habitual criminal charge (T.2 65-66). While the
trial court apparently did not understand the concept of the
conditional plea, the court allowed defense counsel to make a record
of the conditional plea (T.2 66). Relevant transcript pages are
included in Appendix 2

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED
THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL CHARGE.
A. THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE NEW MEXICO FELONY WOULD
TRANSLATE INTO A SECOND DEGREE FELONY UNDER UTAH LAW.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-8-1001 provides,
Any person who has been twice convicted,
sentenced, and committed for felony offenses at
least one of which offenses having been at least
a felony of the second degree or a crime which,
if committed within this state, would have been a
capital felony, felony of the first degree or
felony of the second degree, and was committed to
any prison may, upon conviction of at least a
felony of the second degree committed in this
state, other than murder in the first or second
degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and
be imprisoned in the state prison for from five
years to life.
As noted above, the prosecutor argued that translation of
the New Mexico conviction could be performed by either comparing the
elements of the New Mexico crime with the elements of Utah crimes,
or by examining the facts underlying the New Mexico conviction
(T. 5-6). 3

Under either of the modes proposed by the State, the

3. For examples of the different approaches to translation
of out-of-state convictions under various habitual criminal
statutes, see State v. Heaps, 677 P.2d 1141, 1143 (Wash. App.
1984)("The test for determining the sufficiency of a foreign
conviction for purposes of the habitual offender statutes is if the
indictment or information under which the defendant was convicted
states facts which would constitute the minimum elements of a felony
in Washington."); People v. Crowson, 660 P.2d 389, 393-396 (Cal.
1983)(discussing elements and facts approaches, adopting elements
approach); Martin v. State, 704 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Alaska App.
1985)(foreign conviction found "substantially similar" to Alaska
conviction, and supported sentence enhancement; while one might be
convicted under Alaska law without being subject to punishment in
foreign jurisdiction, dispositive test was whether any person
subject to punishment under the foreign jurisdiction's law would be
punishable under Alaska law).
- 8
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failed to demonstrate that the New Mexico crime would have

been ..PI. least a second degree
The statutory definition of the crime to which Mr. Duran
is as follows:
Manslaughter is the unlawful
being without malice.
A. Voluntary manslaughter consists of
manslaughter committed upon a sudden quarre
in the heat of passion.
New Mexico Statutes -

j

The facts relating *

(State's ExhiDir

^-

^r 1 ' convictio?

rf

ii I'.'C11 C O til H I 1

Mexico
I

"I got in a fight with Patrick Gonzales,
stabbed him."
(Page 4 of transcript inside R

72) ,

Viewing the facts and/or legal definition of the New Mexico
crime with provisions
failed

< tli.it the New Mexico crime would have been at least a
-.he second degree , At tho time* that Mr. Duran's

New Mexico conviction war; entered, Utah code

I n. • h '"• 'nl>

(1975) defined the Utah second degree felony offense of
nilirr. I iiiiiiht or , a?. 111 II 11 iw.

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaugh b =iii : :i f
the actor:
(a) Recklessly causes the death of another;
or
(b) Causes the death of another under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for which there Is a reasonable
explanation or excuse;
(c) Causes the death of another under
circumstances where the actor reasonably believes
the circumstances provide a moral or legal
justification or extenuation for his conduct

although the conduct is not legally justifiable
or excusable under the existing circumstances.
(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree.
The current version of Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-206 is
the same version that would have governed in 1982, and provides as
follows:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal
negligence, causes the death of another.
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.
The levels of intent required in the two Utah statutes are
explained in Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-103, the current version of
which would have governed in 1982, and provides, in part, as follows:
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully
with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or
cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect ot
his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his
conduct when he is aware of the nature of his
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person
acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect
to a result of his conduct when he is aware that
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the
result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the
result of his conduct when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist
or the result will occur. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that its disregard
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard
of care that an ordinary person would exercise
under all the circumstances as viewed from the
actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally
negligent with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his
conduct when he ought to be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur.
- 10 -

The risk must be of such a nature m m degree that
the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
As the Utah Supreme Court noted In State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d
I i " mi!! 1 ., i I in llt'iin I ) , I I i illp'.l in ill I mi i HI between manslaughter and negligent
homicide is almost imaginary.

Quoting Justice Stewart's dissent: in

Bogcress v. State, 655 P.2d 654 at 658 (Utah 1982), the Dyer court

The difference between negligence and
recklessness is not marked by a sharp analytical
line. On the contrary, the difference generally
lies in making a judgment as to where on a
continuum of unreasonable conduct one's behav i c: r
passes from negligence to recklessness. In
essence, it is a matter of judging when conduct
is no longer just gray but dark gray.
671 P. 2d at II 48.
Because the State failed ? demonstrate that the Mew Mexico
conviction would have been a felony
serious criiru ~. *' committed ";.

5econ( j

£egree

ol

I.-J. f. •-• * . il court should have
ismiss.

B. THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO SHOW THAT MR. DURAN HAD SERVED SEPARATE
PERIODS OF CONFINEMENT FOR THE TWO PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS UNDERLYING
THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL CHARGE.
As noted previously , U tali Code Ann.,, section 76-8-1001
provides,
Any person who has been twice convicted,
sentenced, and committed for felony offenses at
least one of which offenses having been at least
a felony of the second degree or a crime which,
if committed within this state, would have been a
capital felony,- felony of the first degree or
- 11

felony of the second degree, and was committed to
any prison may, upon conviction of at least a
felony of the second degree committed in this
state, other than murder in the first or second
degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and
be imprisoned in the state prison for from five
years to life.
In State v. Montague. 671 P.2d 187 (Utah 1983), the Utah
Supreme Court indicated that the legislative intent behind the
habitual criminal statute was not "reformatory/" but was enacted to
"make persistent offenders subject to greater sanctions."
190.

Id. at

In State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1987), the court

quoted Montague, and explained that the habitual criminal charge
could lie whether the two felonies underlying the habitual criminal
charge were sentenced consecutively or concurrently, without
permitting a criminal offender "two separate opportunities to reform
after having been incarcerated."

Id. at 206.

Once again, in

reaching this conclusion the court focused on the legislative
intent: "The crux of the statute is that persistent offenders should
receive greater sanctions, regardless of the order or manner in
which they serve their prison sentences."

Id. at 206.

If the plain language of the Utah statute required only two
felony convictions, the analysis of the Utah Supreme Court would
comport with basic rules of statutory interpretation.

However, the

Utah statute requires two convictions, sentences, and commitments.
See Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 252 n. 11 (Utah 1988)(Utah
Supreme Court has "fundamental duty to give effect, if possible, to
every word of the statute.").

- 12 -

• reading the plain language of the statute were not
M,

sut ticient. *-.« sho

habitual criminal

iil

Mi

ll'i'iii iiii i u i i I ill i m l I p P P I I V I I f e d

o l In i n

-

the absence of spending two separate periods

•inement ' • * •

elonies underlying the habitual criminal

charge, extrinsic proof of legislative intent supports that
conclusion.
The

I in. 111 ni I mi ni I i mi i nil i ni ni I

1975 as House Bill 5.1
section

I i t nil i

liiMii

mi i I

ni IMI «i ni ni ( | i,, e n a c t e d

i n

See Laws of Utah, 1985, chapter 46.

As this Court can determine from reading Appendix J to
11 mi

floor debates on this legislation, the legislature included the
language "and committed"

Utah statute to insure that the
a

person had been convicted, sentenced and committed twice, and had
had, two separate opportunities to reform prior to facing the serious
habitual

criminal

p ena ities.

When the bill was debated '

e House, Representative

Mitchell moved to cuutJiiu. uut; b i n and delete the words "and
committed," because he was concerned that the language all owed
offenders to escape the penalty too easily.

He argued, "What

it iloos here- -sometimes people dlo qet felonies and are

fnel

-i icted.

Sometimes they aren't sentenced or committed.

,/es , I

this committing, and I'm wondering if with this committinc
1 I III

III

ill I

1

I l l 111 I

I I III III I II I II

Ill i l l

I I I I II I

II I II I I I I i P

S

I III I I

I I I III i n

I

committed, might sort of squeezed through the door In the
interpretation of it."

Pages 2 and 3 of transcript of Day 17 of the

13 -

41st Utah State Legislature, House Floor Debates, disk 4, side 1,
beginning at 16. Representative Judd spoke in opposition to the
amendment.

While his response referred to the context of multiple

charges stemming from one criminal episode, he characterized the
requirement that "the individual [serve] on two separate occasions"
as the "guts of the habitual criminal statute."

Pages 3 and 4 of

transcript of Day 17 of the 41st Utah State Legislature, House Floor
Debates, disk 4, side 1, beginning at 16.

Representative

Mitchell's proposed amendment deleting the language "and committed"
failed.

Id. at 5.4
While this Court may consider Hackford and Montague as the

law of the case supporting the trial court's denial of Mr. Duran's
motion to dismiss the habitual criminal charge, because those cases
are wrongly decided in light of the aforementioned rule of statutory
construction and legislative intent, this Court may choose to
certify this case to the Utah Supreme Court for consideration.

See

Utah Code Ann. section 76-2a-3(3)("The Court of Appeals upon its own
motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination
any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.").

4. The Utah Supreme Court has referred to similar floor
debates to determine legislative intent. E.g. State v. Copeland,
765 P.2d 1266, 1269 (Utah 1988); Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314
(Utah 1983).
- 14 -

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of
Mr. Duran's motion to dismiss the habitual criminal charge, and
remand this case to the trial court for withdrawal of the
conditional plea.

I

SUBMITTED this

/7\

day of December, 1990.

Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, hereby certify that eight copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

day of December, 19
»

DELIVERED by
this

day of December, 1990.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

2

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4

STATE OF UTAH

5

Plaintiff,

)

Transcript of:

J

Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss Count 3

6
vs

7
8

JOHNNY MEDINA DURAN

)

9
_

Defendant.

)

Case No. 89-0402

10
11
The

above-entitled

cause

of

action

came on

12
regularly

for hearing before the Honorable Leonard H.

13
Russon, a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the
14
State of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Friday, July
15
28, 1989, at 8:55 a.m.
16
APPEARANCES
17
18
For the State:

WENDY HUFNAGEL
Assistant Attorney General
341 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah.

For the Defendant:

MARY C0RP0R0N
C0RP0R0N & WILLIAMS
9 Exchange Place #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1

FRIDAY, JULY 28, 1989

8:55 A.M.

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

THE COURT: This is the time for hearing in

3
4

State of Utah vs. Duran 89-0402. The defendant, Mr.

5

Duran, is present here in court with counsel, and the

6

state is represented by its counsel. Would you identify

7

yourselves please for the record.
VOICE:

8
9
10
11

Mary Corporon appearing for the

defendant, Your Honor.
VOICE: Wendy Hufnagel appearing on behalf of
the State.

12

THE COURT:

It is defendant's motion.

13

MS. CORPORON:

14

THE COURT: You may proceed.

15

MS. CORPORON:

16

counts pending in the Information.

17

are not in dispute today.

18

to Dismiss Count 3 of the Information which is the

19

habitual criminal charge. As the Court is probably

20

aware, the statute requires that

21

conviction, felony conviction, of at least a second

22

degree before the habitual criminal charge could be

23

brought in this particular action.

24

previous convictions, felony convictions, which my client

25

has prior to the one which are pending in this case.

That is correct, Your Honor.

Your Honor, there are three
The first two counts

The motion today is a Motion

there be a previous

There are two

Those convictions are a Utah third degree and a New
Mexico conviction for what New Mexico has termed
Voluntary Manslaughter, which is a third degree felony
conviction in the State of New Mexico, And I have given
the Court a copy of and attached to our memorandum, a
copy of the New Mexico statute.

I don't think there is

any dispute about the fact the previous manslaughter was
a third degree conviction in the state where the
conviction occurred.

The issue is whether or not that

previous third degree conviction can be used to satisfy
one of the requirements of the habitual criminal statute
and to satisfy the requirement for this Count 3
prosecution.
I submit to the Court that, first of all, if
the conviction in the foreign state is a third degree
conviction, that the Court should defer to the
classification in the foreign state and that the Court
should dismiss Count 3 of the Information because the
statutory prerequisites are simply not satisfied.

If the

Court is inclined to accept the possibility that that
third degree conviction should be considered as a
possible prerequisite for the habitual criminal statute,
then I think the Court must look to the underlying facts
of the case. Because obviously if the Court is not
accepting the classification from New Mexico, then what
2

1

I we are looking to is the underlying facts of what has

2

I occurred in the State of New Mexico which led up to that

3

I conviction.

4

J trial as to the habitual criminal portion of the trial

5

J and require, first, that the State establish not to the

6
7

I would ask the Court then to bifurcate the

jury but to the satisfaction of the Court the legal
J sufficiency of that prior conviction, and that the State

8

be required to satisfy, to produce evidence of what

9

occurred in New Mexico.

And if that incident had

10

occurred in the State of Utah and had been prosecuted in

11

Utah, it would have resulted in a conviction of second

12
13

J degree or higher.
So the procedure which I am proposing to the

14

J Court is, first of all, that Count 3 should be simply

15

I dismissed because the conviction in New Mexico is not

-16
17

J second degree or higher.

If the Court will not do that,

then I am asking for what would really be a trifurcation

18

J of the trial.

19

J jury on Counts 1 and 2, which are the substantive counts,

20
21
22
23
24
25

That first we would go to trial before the

the new counts.

And I believe the case law is clear that

J we cannot present evidence of the habitual offender
problem to the jury until the jury has made a
J determination about Counts 1 and 2, because of the
possibility of prejudice.

And I think State vs. James

I case and other cases this year so hold.

So I think the

procedure should be a trial before the jury on Counts 1
and 2.
If there is a conviction there and we get to
the habitual criminal issue, then I think the State must
present evidence to the Court, to the Bench, to establish
the legal sufficiency of the previous conviction in New
Mexico-

And then if the Court is satisfied that the

facts of what occurred in New Mexico will give rise to a
second or first degree felony conviction in Utah, then
the issue of the habitual offender should be submitted to
the jury.

I will submit it, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Ms. Hufnagel.
MS. HUFNAGEL:

In response, first with regard

to the first portion of counsel's argument that the count
should be dismissed, I think the language of our statute
is itself dispositive of that issue.

The habitual

criminal provision found in Section 76-8-1001, and which
is contained on the second page of counsel's memorandum
of Points and Authorities, contains the language of the
statute itself. "Any person who has been twice convicted,
sentenced and committed for felony offenses, at least one
of which offense is having been at least a felony of
second degree," or —

and I think the following language

is operative here —

a crime which if committed within

this state would have been a capital felony.

Felony of
4

the first degree or felony of the second degree. "
There is no question, and I would stipulate,
that in the State of New Mexico the crime of which the
defendant was convicted, which was voluntary
manslaughter, was characterized in the State of New
Mexico as a felony of the third degree.

I don't think

that has any bearing on what that offense would be in the
State of Utah, particularly where the State of New Mexico
has determinate sentences and has a categorization of
felony offenses that is nowhere near ours.

They have at

least four categories of felonies in the State of New
Mexico, or at least they did in 1982 so there
categorization of offenses is not parallel to that which
obtains in the State of Utah.
Be that as it may, even if it were, I think
that where our statutes say

a felony or a crime which if

committed within this state would have been a felony, at
least a second degree. And under the law of the State of
Utah, the crime of voluntary manslaughter is a felony of
the second degree.

So, as far as outright dismissal as a

matter of law, I think it is clear that the defendant is
not entitled to that relief.
With regard to the manner in which the Court
should proceed in determining whether or not the New
Mexico conviction would have been the crime of voluntary
5

manslaughter in the State of Utah, there is no question
that it is a matter of first impression in the State of
Utah.

And for this Court to determine how to proceed,

and I think that is where we need the Court's guidance, I
think there are two approaches that the Court could take.
One of which would be to consider the elements of the
offense under New Mexico law as shown by the New Mexico
statutes annotated which has been attended to counsel's
brief, which I think we furnished to her office which
talks about what voluntary manslaughter was in 1982 under
the laws of the State of New Mexico, and determining how
that comports with the elements of the offense under the
laws of the State of Utah in determining whether or not
the elements of voluntary manslaughter are met.
Or, there are some other jurisdictions which
have suggested that the Court can actually go behind the
conviction and look at the underlying facts.
either would be sufficient.

I think

I think if the Court is

going to take the first approach, that is something that
can be determined without a trifurcated hearing. There
is no question that we need a bifurcated hearing because
we have a habitual criminal enhancement alleged.

But I

think that if the Court determines it based upon the
elements of the offense, that is something that will not
require a trifurcated hearing.

If the Court determines
6

1

I that it is appropriate to go into the underlying facts,

2

| then obviously we would be producing evidence as to that

3

J offense itself in 1982, consisting of eye-witness

4

testimony and the statement of the defendant given at the

5

time of the commission of the offense.

6

involve, I think, a matter which clearly should not be

7

heard by the jury.

8

Court needs to decide and to give us guidance as to how

9

to proceed.

10

And that would

I think that is something that the

With regards to the motion, I think insofar as

11

that goes, we are premature other than to decide which

12

format we are going to adopt.

13

course, can't occur until there has been a conviction on

14

one or both of the underlying substantive charges before

15

the Court.

16

matter of law Count 3 ought to be dismissed, I think

17

The decision on that, of

But as to counsel's suggestion that, as a

I clearly the statute indicates otherwise.

18

THE COURT:

Ms. Corporon.

19

MS. CORPORON:

Your Honor, the defendant would

20

concur that the New Mexico statutory scheme by

21

classifying crimes and classifying felonies is absolutely

22

nothing like the scheme in the State of Utah.

23

there is a four-tier felony scheme in the State of Utah:

24

first degree, second degree, third degree, fourth degree

25

felony.

We agree

And my fellow pled guilty in New Mexico to a

third degree felony, which puts him in the bottom half of
the severity of the felony categories in the State of New
Mexico.

The State of New Mexico have, for whatever

reason, classified what the defendant did in this state
as being in the bottom half of the severity of the
felonies and it has classified it as a third degree
felony.
I would indicate to the Court that if the Court
is not inclined to dismiss this as a matter of law, and
if we are going to trifurcate these proceedings — Well,
that if we are then going to look at the New Mexico
conviction and determine if it would have been a second
degree conviction in the State of Utah, that simply
looking at the language of one statute and the language
of another in a vacuum, without knowing what the
defendant did and what happened, is not going to be very
helpful and is not, I think, what is intended by our
habitual offender statute. Our statute says that we can
use the previous conviction as one of the prerequisites
for the habitual offender offense if we are dealing with
the crime, which if committed within this state would
have been a capital felony, a felony of the first degree
or a felony of the second degree.

I don't think we can

possibly know if a crime would have been a first, second
or third degree felony or a misdemeanor or no crime at
8

1

all in the State of Utah unless we hear the underlying

2

J facts and unless we know the facts and the defendant's

3

I intent at the time of the commission of the offense.

4

I

I would submit to the Court, I would proffer to

5

the Court that if we get to these underlying facts, my

6

client advises me there is and was an issue of self

7

defense as what occurred in New Mexico which may under

8

Utah law may have resulted in no convictions at all.

9

THE COURT:

We are not going to retry this

10

case. We are not going to try his New Mexico case. It

11

is simply something that isn't going to be done.

12

the only way we can approach this at this point is to

13

have you and the State obtain a transcript of the plea.

I think

14

J I don't know what they do there.

15

I here in the State of Utah, there will be a statement or

16

I affidavit when he pled guilty.

17

I will be something on the record.

18
19
20
21

If they do what we do

If there isn't, there
And normally there will

be a statement of what the elements of the crime are and
I what the facts are to which he is pleading.

And that

will certainly, if that exists, that record will indicate
J what the facts were in that case to bring him within the

22

elements of the crime in New Mexico; and it will be those

23

facts to which he made a plea that will determine whether

24

or not if that had been pled here, it would have been a

25

second or third degree felony.

So before we can go, we need that immediately.
Do we have a trial date on this?
MS. HUFNAGEL: We have a trial date, August
3rd.

There are a few other problems with that, but while

we are on that subject, Your Honor, let me inform you
that in connection with alleging this offense, in
discovery proceedings I have provided counsel with copies
of records which we received from the authorities in the
State of New Mexico which contain the entire
investigative report, including the autopsy report and
subscribed statements of the defendant and witnesses. I
will additionally check with the Court.

I do

think

that the details that I have or the report I have are
somewhat voluminous.

I don't think they contain any

court transcript, but I do have those transcribed
statements.
THE COURT:
made a plea.

I think we need that to which he

If he made a statement, there may be a

defense argument whether it was given freely and
voluntarily or not.

I don't know, but we have to have

more than that.
Now, I think now you need a transcript of his
pleading guilty and see what he pled to, and see if there
are facts to which he made a plea to. And if he did, I
will use that to determine whether or not if that had
10

been pled here or if he had been found guilty of those
facts here, if it would have been a second or third
degree felony.
MS. HUFNAGEL:
THE COURT:

Very well, I will obtain that.

Okay.

I deny the Motion to Dismiss

Count 3, the crime of habitual criminal. The statute 768-1001 is very clear in its language that a crime which
if committed within the state would have been a felony,
second degree felony and so forth, would be sufficient to
meet the requirements.
Mexico calls it.

And it doesn't matter what New

It matters what we will call it in

Utah, and if his actions there, if committed here would
have been a second degree felony, you have met the burden
in that regard.
MS. HUFNAGEL: With regard to our trial
setting, if I can just express some difficulties we have
and this creates a new difficulty.

If we are saying we

are going to proceed to trial and then have a bifurcated
hearing and it is going to be a jury trial, as I
understand it at this point, we would have a hard time
because I am sure I won't be able to get those materials
from New Mexico and transcribed by the third:
THE COURT:

Are you going to have the jury

decide the third count?
MS. HUFNAGEL: Well, that is not up to me.
11

MS. CORPORON:

Your Honor, I think that the

jury would hear Count 1 and 2.

The Court would then

determine whether the underlying facts of Count 3 would
be second degree or higher in Utah and then would proceed
to the jury on Count 3.

If the Court found it against

the defendant, I think that is the procedure.
THE COURT: What facts would you have to
present in regards to Count 3?

What factual issues would

there be?
MS. HUFNAGEL:

They can still put us to our

proof of the conviction themselves.
THE COURT:

Other than that, once there is a

certified copy of the convictions, both in New Mexico and
here, and once we have the other documents, what is there
for the jury to decide?
MS. CORPORON:
time, Your Honor.

Well, I am not sure at this

I may not have anything to present,

but I would need to confer with my client about that.
THE COURT:

The State is saying it needs a

continuance, I guess.
MS. HUFNAGEL:

I am saying there is no way I am

going to be able to get those transcripts from the State
of New Mexico to the Court by August 3rd.
In addition to this case, there was a motion
filed for a hearing on entrapment that has never been
12

1

I noticed up for a hearing.

I was advised yesterday by the

2

| agent in charge in this case, that one of my chain

3

| witnesses has been out of state this week and expected to

4

I be out of state all next week.

I am concerned about

5

that.

I have witnesses that are under subpoena from two

6

different states I am trying to coordinate.

7

THE COURT:

8

MS. HUFNAGEL:

9

MS. C0RP0R0N:

14
15

We don't have any objection to a

I continuance, Your Honor.

12
13

I think that is going to be

necessary at this point.

10
11

Are you moving for a continuance?

THE COURT:

Mr. Duran, you are confined and if

we grant a continuance, that is going to put that down
I the road just a little bit.

You have any objection to

that?

16

MR. DURAN:

No, I don't.

17

THE COURT: You have a right to a speedy trial.

18

I If I grant a continuance you would have to waive that

19

I right.

Do you waive your right to a speedy trial?

20

MR. DURAN:

Yes, I do.

21

THE COURT:

Okay, how much time do you both

22
23
24
25

J need?

How much time does the State need to obtain this

information?
MS. HUFNAGEL:

I would request 30 days to be

safe, I think.
13

1

I

THE COURT: Thirty?

2

MS. HUFNAGEL:

I am going to have to locate in

3

I whose custody the transcript may be and make arrangements

4

to get them transcribed down there and shipped up here.

5

I am not sure how quickly that can be accomplished.

6

would suggest 30.

7

I will work with whatever obviously

I the setting is.

8

MS. C0RP0R0N:

9

Your Honor, I would not have any

objection to the 30 days.

10

THE COURT:

Does your client?

12

MR. DURAN:

No.

13

THE COURT: Okay.

11

Do you, Mr.

I Duran?

14

Then, let's set it in 30

days. How long will it take to try it?

15
16

MS. C0RP0R0N:

Approximately two days, I would

MS. HUFNAGEL:

With the bifurcated.

think.

1?
18

I think

I that includes everything, I think.

19

THE COURT: And then you will decide whether or

20

I not you are going to have a jury for the third count?

21

J

MS. C0RP0B0N: Yes,

22

Your Honor.

THE COURT: Whether there is anything there

23

really.

24
25

I

You will just have to decide that.
MS. C0RP0R0N: Yes.

I

THE COURT:

Let's set this on a Tuesday and
14

1

give it a No. 1 setting.

2

THE CLERK:

3

MS. C0RP0R0N: That would be fine with me, Your

4

How about September 12th.

Honor.

5

MS. HUFNAGEL: At 10:00?

6

THE CLERK: Yes.

7

THE COURT: We have set that far enough down

8

the road, don't delay.

9

those records. We don't want to delay this anymore.

10

Do everything immediately to get

Let's pre-try this on the day before, September

11

11th at 2:00 in the afternoon.

That is a Monday. Now,

12

if there is going to be a change of plea of any kind, it

13

has to be on or before that date.

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
15

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1989

9:00 A.M.

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT: This is the time for hearing in
State of Utah vs. Duran, 89-0402. Would you identify
yourselves and who you are representing?
MS. HUFNAGEL: Wendy Hufnagel appearing for the
State of Utah.
MS. C0RP0R0N:

Mary Corporon for the defendant,

Mr. Duran, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The record should show the
defendant is present.
MS. CORPORON:

May we have his hands released?

THE COURT: Yes, you can release his hands.
MS. CORPORON:

Your Honor, we have a bit of a

problem in that a witness that I had subpoenaed for the
evidentiary hearing this morning has not yet arrived. We
also have a legal matter before the Court and I would ask
leave of the Court to proceed with the legal matter and
the argument on that and then see what's happened with
the status of the witness.
THE COURT: Okay.

How long is this going- to

take?
MS. CORPORON:

I think an hour should cover it.

I don't think the factual testimony is going to be that
lengthy.
1

1

THE COURT:

2

the legal matter, what is that?

3

What are the issues?

MS. CORPORON:

First of all,

The legal matter has to do with

4

count 3 of the Information which is the habitual criminal

5

count.

6
7

THE COURT:

And what is the other

matter?

8
9

Okay.

MS. CORPORON:

And then the other matter is a

Motion to Dismiss for governmental misconduct and we are

10

alleging that we have had a witness who was subpoenaed

11

and it was public record.

12

for the last trial date, our Return of Service, that we

13

had a witness subpoenaed in behalf of the defendant and

14

the government has an informant in this matter.

15

witness and the informant encountered each other at the

16

State* Fair this September and it is my understanding that

17

the informant physically assaulted the witness and made

18

statements threatening him about testimony regarding the

19

defendant's case.

20.

informant is a paid government for the prosecution.

Once our subpoena was filed

The

It is my understanding also that this

21

THE COURT:

Okay, let's hear your legal matter.

22

MS. CORPORON:

Thank you.

Your Honor, we made

23

a Motion to Dismiss count 3 of the Information which is

24

the habitual criminal count.

25

earlier.

The Court heard that

At that time the motion was based solely upon

the fact that one of the underlying convictions upon
which the government would base its case is a New Mexico
manslaughter conviction which in New Mexico was a third
degree conviction and not of sufficient degrees to
support the habitual criminal count of the Information.
The Court denied the motion at that time but
ordered that the government supply us with various
documentation regarding the defendant's previous
convictions.

Now that I have obtained that

documentation, I would like to renew the Motion to
Dismiss count 3 of the Information on a separate basis,
other than what was presented to the Court before as the
attachments to our motion indicates, that the procedure,
the prior proceeding before this Court which was for
theft by receiving.

The conviction for that was run

concurrently with the New Mexico conviction for
manslaughter.

So that Mr. Duran was convicted in New

Mexico of manslaughter; in Utah of theft by receiving and
the Utah Court ran his Utah conviction concurrently with
his New Mexico conviction.
The habitual criminal statute which is 76-81001, requires-that an individual be twice convicted,
twice sentenced and twice committed before they are
subject to the provisions of the habitual criminal
enhancement.

The running of the theft by receiving
3

1

I conviction and currently with the New Mexico conviction,

2

I means that what we had under Utah law is deemed to be a

3

J single sentence and a single period of commitment for a

4

single sentence. Therefore, Mr. Duran's prior

5

convictions for manslaughter and for theft by receiving

6

can only be deemed to be one period of sentence and one

7

I period of commitment by Utah law. And therefore, he

8

cannot be deemed to be subject to the enhancement penalty

9

of the habitual criminal statute.

10

I submitted to the Court a week ago a copy of

11

the Utah Law Review, Utah Legislative Survey dealing with

12

the habitual criminal statute at the time that it was

13

enacted.

14

policy reason why our motion should be granted that is

15

explained in that Law Review Article. On page 838 of the

16

Law Review Article, the portion which I submitted to the

17

Court, that article indicates that evidently the

18

legislature felt that criminal defendants should be given

19

the opportunity of at least two periods of confined

20

rehabilitation prior to being classified as habitual

21

criminals. Johnny Duran has been given only one period

22

of confined opportunity for rehabilitation and that was

23

when he was sentenced and served concurrent sentences for

24

one conviction for the two crimes of theft by receiving

25

and manslaughter.

And I think there is an additional public

The intention of the legislature, I think, in
enacting this Section 1001 was to give an individual two
chances in confinement to demonstrate they are capable of
rehabilitation and capable of changing themselves and
avoiding criminal conviction in the future before they
are subject to this enhancement penalty. And in this
case where Mr. Duran has had only one prior period of
incarceration, he has not been given that opportunity
which the legislature deemed appropriate.

It is not

therefore appropriate that he have the habitual criminal
enhancement and count 3 of the Information should be
dismissed.

He should go forward to trial only on counts

1 and 2 which are the underlying substantive counts
regarding the drug transactions or the alleged drug
transactions.
THE COURT: Ms. Hufnagel.
MS. HUFNAGEL:

Your Honor, in response to

counsel's argument today, I am not going to reiterate
previously what has been my point, which is that in fact
the -allegation contained in count 3 complies with the
Utah Habitual Criminal Statute, in that the defendant has
been twice convicted and committed, one offense of which
would have been under Utah law a felony of the second
degree.
I think that the Utah Law Review article that
5

counsel cites this morning is unpersuasive in that the
author on page 838 says, "Evidently, the legislature felt
at least two periods of confined rehabilitation."

That

the defendant should be given the opportunity of at least
two periods of confined rehabilitation.
an assumption on the part of the author.

I think that is
I think that is

not what the law requires. That is not what the law
states.

It doesn't state that the defendant shall have

been convicted of two prior felonies and shall have
served either consecutive periods of confinement or
separate periods of confinement; but rather the statutory
authority says, "shall have been convicted and committed
on two occasions."
I think that counsel's argument that somehow
when the Court gives concurrent sentences or different
Courts give concurrent sentences, that that somehow
merges the commitments into one, is likewise
unpersuasive.
At this time, if I may approach the bench, I
would present to the Court the materials that I have
previously presented to the defense, which is a partial
transcript of the proceedings of the defendant's plea in
the State of New Mexico and certified copies of documents
from the New Mexico file.
I would also like to submit to the Court at
6

this time certified copies of two separate commitments.
One out of the Third District Court for the State of
Utah, that being the Third Degree Felony commitment, and
one being the commitment on the charge of voluntary
manslaughter out of the State of New Mexico.
that those be made part of the record.

I would ask

All of those

documents have been furnished to defense counsel. But I
think that clearly the state's evidence in this case, if
the defendant were convicted of the underlying
substantive offenses contained in counts 1 and 2 of the
Information, would support the findings by this Court
that he is in fact a habitual criminal as that term is
defined under our statutes.
THE COURT: Mr. Corporon.
MS. CORPORON: There are only two convictions
which the Court can consider as the basis for count 3 of
the Information. One is the manslaughter conviction in
New Mexico, which is a third degree in New Mexico. The
second one is the theft by receiving conviction in Utah,
which is also a third degree conviction in Utah. The
Court has already rejected my argument to the effect that
these constitute two third degree prior convictions that
are not sufficient for the habitual criminal enhancement.
However, not only must there be two prior convictions,
one of them at least of a second degree and the Court has
7

1

found the manslaughter in New Mexico to be second degree

2

or something which would have been second degree under

3
4
5

J Utah law; but the defendant must also have been twice
convicted, twice sentenced and twice committed.
Section 76-3-401(7) is the section of the Utah

6

Code pertaining to concurrent sentences and it provides

7

that whenever a sentence is imposed or sentences are

8

imposed to run concurrently with other sentences "the

9

lessor sentence shall merge into the greater and the

10
11
12
13
14
15

greater shall be the term to be served."
Counsel says that my merger argument is somehow
in error, but that is exactly what the Utah law says
J happens when you run sentences concurrently.

The lessor

sentence and the greater sentence merge into the greater
J sentence and it becomes as one sentence under Utah law.

16

Therefore, when the Utah theft by receiving conviction

17

was run concurrently with the New Mexico manslaughter

18

conviction, by Utah law they merged, they became one

19

sentence and one commitment. Mr. Duran therefore had

20

only one sentence and only one9commitment and only one

21

opportunity for rehabilitation; and before he is

22

subjected to the penalties and the enhancement of the

23

criminal enhancement statute, he is entitled to one more

24

opportunity of rehabilitation.

25

This is simply not an appropriate case for
8

imposition of the habitual criminal statute or provision
and I would ask that count 3 be dismissed.
MS. HUFNAGEL: To respond in one sentence, Your
Honor.

It is the sentences that merge for purposes of

the time being served.

It is not the commitments that

merge and there is no language in the statute that speaks
of commitments merging one with another.

If we were to

assume that kind of logic, then we are one commitment to
be overturned.
charge.

We would have no commitment on the other

That is illogical. There are two separate

commitments, two separate jurisdictions, two different
dates of commitment.
THE COURT: Okay.

Anything further, Ms.

Corporon?
MS. CORPORON:

No, Your Honor, I will submit

it.
THE COURT: There is no question that there
have been two convictions, separate from one another.
And there is no question that there has been two
sentences imposed, separate from one another. And, I
guess it really comes down to whether or not there is one
or two convictions. And this Court is going to hold and
find that there have been two commitments separate and
apart from one another.
The Court is often faced with a question on
9

multiple counts in sentencing a prisoner, whether one has
been convicted of ten counts, whether to take those and
make him serve his time in the State Prison, 1 to 15
years to run consecutively, or whether to make those run
concurrently.

And if they are not truly separate counts,

then the Court would be in error in sentencing either
consecutively or concurrently.

There would have to be a

conviction on the lessor included offense or the offense
itself, whichever the law would provide.

In a case where

you have totally separate incidents, if it were drugs,
totally separate sales of totally different times, those
are individual, independent crimes.

Each one could be

tried separately, one from the other, and often are. And
sometimes they are tried together and that sometimes
becomes a legal argument that we are confronted with, but
esach one is a separate and different crime.
The most compelling argument you make is the
argument of giving the man two different trips to the
prison before you are going to hammer him with the
habitual criminal statute.

That is the best argument.

But as I read this statute, I think it is clear from the
documents that Mr. Duran has been convicted for two
separate crimes, in two separate states, has been
sentenced for two separate crimes, in two separate
states, and has been committed by two separate Courts, in
10

two separate states. And the fact that one of those
states was good enough to cut him a break and say, "We'll
let this sentence run concurrent with the other
sentence," should not be to his benefit because the Court
could have just as easily said, "This would be a
consecutive sentence and when you finish your term down
in New Mexico, then you can come up and start your term
up in Utah."
I believe that is what is intended by this
statute to deal with different crimes, different
conditions, different sentences and different
commitments.

And the fact that one of the Judges allowed

the sentence in his state to run at the same time the
other one is running in another state, does not negate
the applicability of the habitual criminal statute. The
motion therefore is denied.
Okay, now, where are we?
MS. CORPORON: Your Honor, I had discussed with
my client prior to this hearing the possibility that the
Court's ruling may be as it just has been. And he has
indicated to me that — Well, we have discussed the fact
and I would indicate to the Court this is a case of first
impression in Utah.
First of all, the issue of how to deal with the
foreign conviction, with a different degree pattern than
11

APPENDIX 2

set this for sentencing on
THE CLERK:

—

November 13th at 2:00.

MS, CORP0R0N:

I believe I could do it then,

Your Honor.
MS, HUFNAGEL:

I am going to be in trial. It

looks like it is going to go on that day.
MS. C0RP0R0N:

Your Honor, the following week

would put us into the week of Thanksgiving and I have
airfare pre-purchased to depart on the 19th and return
the evening of the 27th.
(Court and counsel discussing court dates.)
THE COURT: Mr. Duran, you have a right to be
sentenced within 30 days by our statute unless there is
something unusual that comes up.
however, you can waive.

That is a right,

Does it matter to you whether we

sentence you within 30 days?
MR. DURAN:

I waive my rights.

I prefer to

have a little bit more time.
THE COURT:

Let's set this for December 11th at

2:00.
MS. C0RP0RQN:

Your Honor, I also wanted to

indicate for the record, one final aspect of the
agreement I had with counsel, and I believe she
understood I would be specifically reserving on the
record the issue of our Motion to Dismiss Count 3 of the
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1

Information and the legal issues raised regarding the

2

habitual criminal statute, and it will be my intention to

3

reserve those for appellate review.

4

THE COURT: They have been dismissed.

5

MS. CORPORON:

6

THE COURT: They will never hear it. The State

That is true, Your Honor.

7

has dismissed it, but you can make a record on that, if

8

you want.

9
10

MS. CORPORON:

I would like to make the record,

Your Honor, and discuss that with my client.

11

THE COURT: You have a right to do what you

12

want, but if it is dismissed there is nothing to appeal

13

there is no issue.

14

MS. CORPORON:

I suspect that there is a great

15

deal of validity in what the Court says, but I would

16

still like to reserve.

17

THE COURT:

If there is anything to appeal, and

18

I don't know if Mr. Duran would want you to appeal it.

19

What if you lost?

20

MS. CORPORON: Well, I prefer not to say what

21
22

THE COURT: You don't need to say anything, Mr.

23

Duran.

24

Since it is dismissed, there is not that issue facing Mr.

25

Duran or the issue before the Court.

That is on the record.

Whatever you do, you do.
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APPENDIX 3

HOUSE BILL 51
HABITUAL CRIMINALS
by Representative
Cannon, Representative
Newman
, Part 10, Chapter 8, Title 76, Utah Code Annotated
1953
criminals providing procedures
for
and punishment
violation by the
State of Utah.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE:
NEWMAN:
the

Representative Newman.

I make a motion that we commence with the reading of
and

SPEAKER:
first

Are you prepared to speak to us?
sponsor on the floor.

I don't see the

NEWMAN: Well, he's left it up to me through all the committees and
everything else, so I just as well carry the ball here.
SPEAKER: The motion is that we dispense with any further reading on
House Bill 51 and allow the sponsors to explain it. All in favor of
that motion say "aye."
BODY:

Aye

SPEAKER:
BODY:

Any opposed "no."

(no response)

SPEAKER:

The ayes have it. Representative Newman.

NEWMAN: There has been concern throughout the state of Utah on
private citizens on the habitual criminal law of people that serve
more than one prison term and being able to get out sometimes pretty
easy, and they feel that, that they just go right back to doing what
it was. And I left
passed out on your desk the other day,
yesterday, prison sentences served. And it gives 271 year, 138 two
years, 365 and more than 348. And a bunch of the citizens feel, as
well as so does the Chief of Police of Salt Lake City and also of
the
Salt Lake County, that they would like to see the
habitual criminal law be put back in the code. It was left out when
the code was redone and passed in the Legislature before this, and
they felt like it should be back in it. And that's about all I have
to say on it.
SPEAKER: Are there other representatives who wish to speak on this
measure. We're considering House Bill 51, Habitual Criminals.
Representative Pace.
PACE: Mr. Speaker. I haven't had a great deal of practice in the
area of criminal law, but I do know that one of the problems with

habitual criminal acts in other states is the fact that it creates a
relunctance in the part of the, of judges and sometimes prosecuting
officers to prosecute the final criminal charge because the final
criminal charge would impose upon them, upon the defendant, a charge
and rather severe penalty that isn't based upon the charge but only
upon the fact that they have been tried and convicted and with this
act tried and convicted three times. As a result, the intensity of
the prosecution and the direction which might be given to the court
by the judge is sometimes less vigorous than it might be otherwise
because they are looking at the problem of the conviction of the
habitual criminal. I think that in passing this act, we have to
take into consideration that we may find a few habitual criminals
but we may also build in factors which will cause the acquittal of
many people who otherwise would have been convicted of a felony and
would be a lesser offense than the habitual criminal conviction.
And so I really question whether we will be doing society any good
on the whole. Because while we may find some habitual criminal
convictions, there undoubtedly will be many felonies for which
people will not be convicted or for which the charge will be reduced
to a misdemeanor in order to avoid the necessity and the harsh
penalties of the habitual criminal act. And so, while I can't give
you any figures, and I don't think any figures could possibly be
derived because this is the type of thing on which there wouldn't be
any statistics, I think, fellow representatives, that our action a
year ago in passing the codification of the criminal code, that
those that were doing that codification carefully considered this
problem among others, and I don't really think we've had enough
experience yet to be making this type of change in that code. And I
think we ought to seriously consider that before we adopt this
proposal and make this rather basic change in the designation of
habitual criminals as defined in this act.
SPEAKER:

Representative Mitchell.

MITCHELL: Yes, I would like to make an amendment on line 16 of
page 1. I would like to take out "and committed." We'll strike it
before "and" and after "committed."
SPEAKER:
MITCHELL:

Is there a second to that motion?
What I feel it does here

SPEAKER: Representative Mitchell, I didn't hear a second.
a second?

SPEAKER:

OK, it's been seconded.

Is there

You may discuss it.

MITCHELL: What I feel it does here—Sometimes people do get
felonies and are convicted. Sometimes they aren't sentenced or
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committed. A lot of times in this committing, and I'm wondering if
with this committing in it, when a person has committed a couple
felonies and hasn't been committed, might sort of squeezed through
the door in the interpretation of it.
SPEAKER: Is there anyone who wishes to speak on the proposed
amendment? Representative Judd.
JUDD:

I didn't hear the amendment so I can't really respond to it.

SPEAKER: The amendment was that the words "and committed" on
line 16 of page 1 of the bill be deleted so that it would read, "any
person who has been twice convicted, sentenced for felony offenses
to any prison, shall upon conviction of a felony committed in this
state" etc.
JUDD: I would speak against that amendment. And in speaking
against that amendment, perhaps I need to tell you how the habitual
criminal statute works both as to this amendment and also to counter
what Representative Pace said. I have prosecuted a number of
habitual criminal informations. As you will note, on the second
page of the bill, one of the requirements is that, first of all, in
response to Representative Pace, first of all, you have to convict
the criminal of the crime that he is under indictment for or under
the information for; that is, if he has committed a burglary, you
charge him with burglary, and in the course of your discovery of
this individual, you discover that in fact he has served on two
separate occasions in a penitentiary terms of longer than one year,
so that essentially the element and the really the guts of the
habitual criminal statute is that requirement that the individual
have served on two separate occasions for longer than one year. And
that's why I'm against this amendment. I think that if in fact he
is just convicted of two felonies, a person, for instance, who might
be convicted of forgery, under the old statute, he could well have
in one act committed two violations, two felonies. That is, he, not
only did he pass a forged check, which is one felony, but he also
wrote it, he uttered it, in other words, so that that's another
felony. And many times an individual could be on one separate
occasions be convicted of two different felonies, so that if in fact
a person passed one check which he himself had made out, he could
well, under the terms of Representative Mitchell's situation, be
convicted of two different felonies and sentenced on both of those
felonies. Now, in that regard, he would then be serving only one
sentence, so that that individual, having been convicted and
sentenced on one occasion, could well, if you allowed this
amendment, on the next felony be subject to the increased penalty of
the habitual criminal act. Now the habitual criminal act only comes
into play when an individual has been convicted and then sentenced
on two separate occasions and has in fact served. You convict him
first of all of the crime. And after the jury has returned its
verdict, then the second page of the information is revealed to the
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jury, so that the jury then discovers that in fact they have to go
again trying this same person for the crime of being an habitual
criminal. And this crime of being an habitual criminal then
requires that the prosecuting attorney prove, first of all, that
this same individual on a previous occasion had been convicted and
on a previous occasion had in fact served time on that conviction,
and then he has to prove it, the same thing, on another felony and
on another sentence, so that in reality, the jury, having convicted
him of the felony for which he is now charged or on what he has now
been convicted, then this same jury makes a finding based on the
evidence which is presented as to whether or not he is an habitual
criminal. Then the judge, under the terms of this statute, would in
fact sentence him to a term of from fifteen years to life not under
the original felony but rather under the habitual criminal statute,
so that there are adequate safeguards, I think more than adequate
safeguards, if you do not amend the bill. I think that the bill as
it presently stands is very adequate, and if you begin to tinker
with it and to in effect delimit its application by in effect
removing the requirement that he in fact serve, you then create some
very serious problems as far as the law enforcement community is
concerned. And I speak against the amendment because I think that
really it would cripple the entire nature of the bill, and I speak
in favor of the bill as it is written.
SPEAKER: Representatives, I don't think it was pointed out to you
earlier, and maybe it's within my prerogative to do so, and that is
that the bill was amended in committee and the amendments should be
there in your book, House Bill 51. There is a motion for an
amendment before us. Are there other representatives who wish to
speak to the motion? The motion is that the words on page 1,
line 16 of the bill "and committed" be deleted. Any further
discussion on that motion? Representative Mitchell.
MITCHELL: I would like to suggest you vote for the motion. Here's
a good example of what I've seen happen. About a year ago, my home
was broken into. At this time, the individual who was out had been
sort of put on probation in relation. He can committed a felony
before this time. He plead guilty in court in relation to the
burglary in my home. It wasn't two months later that I found him
walking the streets again, and I think this happens way too many
times and I think it's time we took a look at this and kept some of
these people of the street. Thank you.
SPEAKER: All in favor of the motion which is to delete the words
"and committed" on page 1, line 16. All in favor of that motion say
"aye."
BODY:

Aye

SPEAKER:

Any opposed "no."
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BODY:

No

SPEAKER: The nos have it. The motion fails and the bill is before
us again for discussion. Now there is a question, these amendments
which I have here have no name on them and they are not a part of a
committee report. Were they placed in committee or not?
Representative Judd, can you answer that?
JUDD:

Mr. Speaker, the bill was not amended in committee.

SPEAKER: Oh, I'm sorry then. The amendment that had found its way
to your book has not been included and is not part of the bill.
JUDD: I think, Mr. Speaker, that they are Representative Brown's
amendments.
SPEAKER:
Brown.

Oh, they have no name on.

I'm sorry.

Representative

BROWN: Mr. Speaker. I'd like to move we adjourn until two
o'clock. Is that in order?
SPEAKER:
BROWN:

A recess

Recess

which have not been offered.
whether or not those ought to be considered.

I wonder

SPEAKER: All right. It is my understanding that no mention had
ever been made on them even though they had been placed in your
book. They are not a part of the bill, and unless someone makes a
motion, they won't be a part of it.
:
SPEAKER:

Thank you.

Representative Brown, do you wish to

?

BROWN: Mr. Speaker. I would like to make a motion to amend House
Bill 51. And in way of background of this amendment, I would like
to explain that I have gone through the existing code and maybe we
can go through certain portions of that code to discuss the purpose
of the amendment. In the criminal code, bribery of a
official is
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SENATE DISCUSSION OP THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTE
INTRODUCTION OF BILL AND PROPOSED CHANGES
:

I propose we adopt the

PRESIDENT:
moves that we adopt the committee report
and then carry
amendment
that have
been handed to you. Now, Senator
.
: I'm just going to urge that you adopt the committee
report.
PRESIDENT:

Senator Snow.

SNOW:
the committee now
changes that we didn't have a chance to
think this kind of bill with amendments
this
calendar. And I, for one,
removed.

is making some substantial
see before, and I don't
ought to be on the
would like to see that it be

PRESIDENT: Maybe before you do that, could we offer an explanation
as to what the committee has done. When we adopted the new criminal
code, we removed from it the habitual criminal provision. And that
was
police authorities felt that it was necessary to
have. So this bill was introduced which
the habitual
criminal provision. Now the way they were drafted and came before
us in judiciary, it was pretty harsh. So the amendments that you
have on the
copy make it discretionary the court to
say that he may and we could more thoroughly define the areas in
which this would come into effect, and they've got to be fairly
serious crimes before you get into the situation of the habitual
criminal. And the amendments which the committee adopted were to
make certain that the individual liberties that the individual
possessed were really not being abused by this statute. And I think
with the amendments in, that then this becomes an effective piece of
legislation to go on or, if you want to call it part of the
crime
that we have.
in that
kind of context. And so I propose the amendments and, with the
amendments, propose the bill. Now do you have any further
questions, Senator Snow? OK, the
SNOW:

Are you calling for a question on the bill then?

PRESIDENT:
first of all to adopt the committee
report.
the motion has been placed to adopt the committee
report by Senator
. All in favor say "aye."
BODY:

Aye

PRESIDENT:

Opposed "no"
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BODY:

No

PRESIDENT:
us.
on

The report is adopted. The bill is before
secretary call the roll on passing House Bill 51
.

SECRETARY:

Individual vote
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